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NOTES AND COMMENTS
against the state, and, if so, whether the state had waived its immunity.
Upon finding that the suit was against the state and that the state had
not waived its immunity, the court dismissed the suit. It was unneces-
sary to rule on the question of diversity or federal question jurisdiction.
In cases where the Eleventh Amendment has been waived by the state,
jurisdiction can never be based on diversity of citizenship, but juris-
diction may be exercised on grounds of a federal question provided the
complaint properly alleges that the suit arises under the United States
Constitution, a federal statute or treaty.
If the court of appeals in the Lowes case was correct in holding
there was liability on the part of certain individual parties because of
their violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, then it is submitted
that the school district should have been dismissed as a party.31 In
that event the Eleventh Amendment would be no obstruction to the dis-
trict court's jurisdiction. However, so long as the school district re-
mained a party, it would seem that the court would have no jurisdiction
on any grounds.
LowRY M. BETTs.
Real Property-Recordation of Federal Condemnation Judgments in
the County of the Condemned Land
The recent federal case of United States v. Norman Lumber Co.1
has presented to attorneys still another obstacle to overcome in the
long road of searching titles. This was an action brought by the federal
government to determine title to certain lands and to recover the value
of timber removed therefrom. In federal condemnation proceedings
2
in 1936 certain lands in Montgomery County, North Carolina were
condemned. One Bruton and his heirs, the owners of the property here
in question, were made parties to those proceedings. The judgment
was docketed and cross-indexed in the office of the clerk of the United
States district court, and docketed, indexed and cross-indexed in the
office of the Clerk of Superior Court of Montgomery County, North
Carolina, but in the latter the names of the Bruton heirs did not appear.
The judgment was not registered in the office of the Register of Deeds
of Montgomery County, although the judgment by its terms required
that this be done. In 1951 the Bruton heirs executed a timber deed
to the Norman Lumber Company who then began to remove the tim-
ber from the property in suit.
31 See McCartney v. West Virginia, 156 F. 2d 739 (4th Cir. 1946).
'United States v. Norman Lumber Co., 127 F. Supp. 518 (M. D. N. C. 1955),
aff'd, 223 F. 2d 868 (4th Cir. 1955).
'United States v. 1053.2 acres of land in Montgomery County, North Carolina.
[As cited in the District Court opinion, 127 F. Supp. 518 (M. D. N. C. 1955).]
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Although there were other matters involved in the original action,
the main question became: "Must a federal judgment of condemnation
of land be indexed and cross indexed in the county where the land
lies in order to give notice to a purchaser for value without notice of
the proceeding?"3 The district court answered this query in the nega-
tive and its decision was affirmed by the court of appeals.
The main reasons employed by these courts were generally as fol-
lows: (1) There can be no question that the condemnation proceeding
in rem gave title to the United States good against the world, as well as
the Bruton heirs;4 (2) The North Carolina statutes as to recordation
and cross indexing of judgments have no application to federal judg-
ments of condemnation unless an act of Congress so provides, and no
such provision can be found.5 (3) The act authorizing federal con-
demnation in 19366 did provide for conformity with state practice "as
near as may be," but this conformity has been held to relate only to
court procedure and not to registration of muniments of title.7 The
court supported this view by stating: "That docketing and cross in-
dexing of the judgment of condemnation in accordance with state law
for the protection of possible purchasers from the condemnee was not
regarded as a part of the procedure provided for by the old condemna-
tion statute is properly inferable from the fact that no provision there-
fore is contained in Rule 71A, 28 U. S. C., which took the place of
the stautory procedure." (4) The Lien of Judgments Act0 does not
apply to federal condemnation proceedings. "Congress recognized the
distinction in that it passed on the same day two separate and distinct
statutes with respect to these matters .... If it had been the intention
that the provisions of the Lien of Judgments Act apply to proceedings
under the Condemnation Act it would have been easy enough to so
provide; and the fact that no such provision was made indicates that
nothing of the sort was intended."'1
'Norman Lumber Co. v. United States, 223 F. 2d 868, 870 (4th Cir. 1955).
"Ibid.
'Norman Lumber Co. v. United States, 223 F. 2d 868, 871 (4th Cir. 1955).
825 STAT. 357, 40 U. S. C. 258 (1888).
' Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 499 (1896).
8 Norman Lumber Co. v. United States, 223 F. 2d 868, 871 (4th Cir. 1955).
'25 STAT. 357 (1888), 28 U. S. C. 1962 (1948). "Every judgment rendered
by a District Court within a State shall be a lien on the property located in such
State in the same manner, to the same extent and under the same conditions as ajudgment of a court of general jurisdiction in such State, and shall cease to be
a lien in the same manner and time. Whenever the law of any State requires ajudgment of a State Court to be registered, recorded, docketed or indexed, or any
other act to be done, in a particular manner, or in a certain office or county or
parish before such lien attaches, such requirements shall apply only if the law of
such State authorizes the judgment of a court of the United States to be registered,
recorded, docketed, indexed or otherwise conformed to rules and requirements re-
lating to judgments of the courts of the State."
"0 Norman Lumber Co. v. United States, 223 F. 2d 868, 872 (4th Cir. 1955).
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The court concluded that although the resulting situation would
work a severe hardship on attorneys, the question "whether docketing
and cross indexing of federal judgments of condemnation with state
court records should be required as a condition of validity as against sub-
sequent purchasers from the condemnee is a matter for Congress, and,
so far, Congress has not seen fit to take action with regard to the
matter."
1
'
This is, on the whole, a well reasoned and well supported decision;
however, there is one area of possible weakness, and that is the holding
of the court of appeals that the Lien of Judgments Act does not apply
to a federal condemnation proceeding. The court sought to draw an
inference that Congress did not intend the Lien of Judgments Act to
apply to federal condemnation proceedings from the fact that the two
statutes were passed on the same day and placed in different chapters
of the Statutes at Large. A closer examination of the passage of these
two acts indicates that there is little support for such an inference.
The bills were introduced at different times, 12 were sent to different
committees,' 3 discussed and amended on different occasions, 14 and in
none of the committee or floor discussions on either bill is there any
reference made one to the other to indicate an intent to exclude con-
demnation proceedings from the scope of the Lien of Judgments Act.
The only point of similarity in the legislative history of these acts is
that the final reading and voice vote on the bills took place on the
same day.' 5 This history, of course, does not indicate conclusively that
Congress intended the Lien of Judgments Act to apply to federal con-
demnation proceedings, but neither does it seem to exclude the possi-
bility of inferring such an intent, as was suggested by the court in the
present case. Indeed, a possible inference contra to the court of ap-
peals' ruling may be found in the Committee Report presented to the
House of Representatives which stated: "The only purpose of the pro-
posed legislation [Lien of Judgments Act] is to place judgments of
11 Ibid.
' -The Condemnation authorization was introduced in the House of Representa-
tives on January 30, 1888. 19 CoNG. REc. 805 (1888). The Lien of Judgments Act
was introduced by the Judiciary Committee as a substitute for other bills that had
been pending in Congress for two sessions on March 7, 1888. Id. at 1829.
"3 The Condemnation authorization was referred to the Committee on Public
Buildings and Grounds. 19 CONG. REc. 805 (1888). The Lien of Judgments
Act was referred to the Judiciary Committee. Id. at 1829.
14 The Condemnation authorization was amended and passed by the House of
Representatives on February 21, 1888. 19 CONG. REc. 1387 (1888) and amended
and passed by the Senate on July 17, 1888. Id. at 6401. The Lien of Judgments
Act was debated and passed by the House of Representatives on-March 22, 1888.
19 CONG. REc. 2359 (1888) and debated and passed by the Senate on July 9,
1888. Id. at 6014.
"5 Both acts were examined and signed on July 21, 1888. 19 CoNG. REc. 6654
(1888).
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State and Federal Courts upon a perfect equality in each state, and that
the same provisions of State Law which regulate the docketing, regis-
tration, or recording of the judgments of the State Courts shall be
made applicable to the judgments of the United States Courts, when
authorized by the laws of such State."'16 Also, in all of the recorded
debate and discussion, covering a period of twelve years, concerning
the adoption of Rule 71A, which replaces the old statutory condemna-
tion proceedings, there appears to be no mention of any activity beyond
the actual court procedure.17 From this the court inferred that cross
indexing and registration of the judgment was not intended by the
Congress to be necessary. However, it would seem equally as proper
to infer that Congress intended for the Lien of Judgments Act to apply
to federal condemnation and felt no necessity to repeat the same in-
structions in this new rule.
The Supreme Court of the United States, on appeal, might reverse
this decision by disagreeing with the circuit court as to the applica-
bility of the Lien of Judgments Act to federal condemnation proceed-
ings. It appears from the record of debate on this act, the House of
Representative Reports and the adoption of Rule 71A with its silence
on this matter, that the Supreme Court, by taking a reasonable view
of these factors, might properly infer that Congress did intend for the
Lien Act to apply to federal condemnation proceedings. However,
in the event that the Supreme Court upholds the circuit court's ruling
on this point, the decision must be affirmed; for as Judge Hayes said
in the district court decision: "It is true it imposes a severe hardship
on attorneys undertaking to examine titles, to have to inquire at the
office of the clerk of the United States district court before he can be
sure there is no condemnation judgment entered there which is not
recorded and cross indexed in the county where the land lies, but this
inconvenience cannot outweigh the public interest in safe-guarding and
protecting the property of the United States in accordance with the
laws of the United States."'18
If the Supreme Court affirms this decision, the obvious solution
to the resulting inequities which necessarily follow is that suggested
by Chief Judge Parker in the circuit court's opinion, i.e., a clear man-
date from Congress requiring that federal condemnation proceedings be
indexed and recorded in the county where the land lies. Such a man-
date should be enacted at once. The rights of the federal government
still would be adequately protected, the prospective purchaser for value
l Id. at 2359.
1 See 11 F. R. D. 213 (1952), discussing the adoption of Rule 71A.
"United States v. Norman Lumber Co., 127 F. Supp. 518, 521 (M. D. N. C.
1955).
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would have proper notice, and the attorneys' duties would be eased
and clarified.
HERBERT T. MITCHELL, JR.
Real Property-Riparian Rights
Because Y irrigated his cabbages and collards with the contam-
inated water of Beaverdam Creek, the North Carolina Commissioner
of Agriculture secured an injunction to prohibit the sale or disposition
of the crop. Y thereupon sued the defendant municipal corporations
for negligently permitting sewage to pollute the creek. The North
Carolina court reversed the judgment for damages below and said that
the motion for nonsuit should have been allowed.1 In the course of
the opinion the court stated that riparian rights were not established
in Y because he had no allegation in his complaint that he or his
lessor was a riparian proprietor, neither allegation nor proof that he
or his lessor had acquired a right to use the waters of the creek by pre-
scription or adverse use, nor proof that he or his lessor had authority
and license from an alleged riparian owner to use the water. The
court then raised two important questions by quaere: (1) What is the
physical extent of riparian land?2 (2) Can a riparian owner transfer
his riparian rights to a non-riparian owner 'for use on non-riparian'
land? This note is concerned with the problems raised by these ques-
tions.3
In the common law riparian states4 that have considered the first
question, two theories have developed concerning the physical extent of
riparian land. One doctrine is the watershed rule5 which requires land
' Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N. C. 619, 86 S. E. 2d 408 (1955).
'Land to be riparian must have the stream flowing over it or along its borders.
Stratbucker v. Junge, 153 Neb. 885, 46 N. W. 2d 486 (1951). The land must be
in actual contact with the water and mere proximity without contact is insufficient.
Kingsley v. Jacobs, 174 Ore. 514, 149 P. 2d 950 (1944).
Any treatment of the prior appropriation theory of water rights or of the
attainment of water rights by prescription or adverse use is beyond the scope of
this note. The doctine of prior appropriation- is that the one who first diverts and
applies to a beneficial use the waters of a stream has a prior right thereto, to the
extent of his appropriation. 56 AM. Jim., Waters § 291 (1947). Prescription or
adverse use is the acquiring of ownership of a water right by adverse use. The
use must be continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive under a claim of
right for the prescriptive period. 56 Am. JuR., Waters § 326 (1947).
'There are two separate and distinct systems of water rights in the United
States. One is the riparian doctrine which developed under the English common law.
The other is the prior appropriation doctrine which developed in the arid western
states of the United States. Generally the common law riparian doctrine is that
each riparian proprietor is entitled to have the water course flow by or through his
land in its natural course and quality, subject only to reasonable use by himself
and other riparian proprietors. The prior appropriation doctrine is the doctrine
that the first person to apply the water of a stream to a beneficial use is entitled
to the full flow of the stream, whether he is a riparian owner or not. Agnor,
Riparian Rights in the South Eastern States, 5 S. C. L. Q. 141, 143, 147 (1952).
'Research indicates that the following states have the watershed theory:
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